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Are Current U.S.  Farm Commodity
Programs Outdated? Arguments in the
Affirmative
Luther Tweeten
Farm  commodity  programs  devised over  one-half  century  ago  have  outlived  their useful-
ness.  The  structure  of  agriculture  is  different  today than  in  1933.  Comparatively  little  excess
labor remains in farming.  The industry  is capable of adjusting  to changes likely to develop over
the next decade  or so.  Current problems in agriculture are the result of macroeconomic  policies
and  commodity  programs.  The  paper  presents  elements  of  a transition  program to lower  the
government's  role in supporting  farm  prices and incomes.
The  thesis of this paper  is that current
commodity  programs  are  outdated.  To
evaluate  that  thesis,  the  paper  first  con-
trasts the  economic  setting  and structure
of  agriculture  in  1933  and  today.  After
listing major farm problems and ability or
inability  of  commodity  programs  to  ad-
dress  them,  the  paper  presents  elements
of a transition  program  to lower  the gov-
ernment profile  in supporting farm prices
and incomes.
The political-economic  system  ideally
provides abundant, high quality food and
fiber to consumers at low and stable prices;
provides  reasonably  stable  and adequate
returns  to  producers  free  to  make  their
own production  and marketing  decisions;
and minimizes  government  costs  and ad-
ministrative  burdens.  These  objectives
often conflict. It is possible to increase farm
income  at  the expense  of consumers  and
taxpayers  or  to reduce  food  costs  at  the
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expense  of  farmers.  Tradeoffs  are  inevi-
table.
Optimal  tradeoffs  recognize  that  the
overall objective of the political-economic
system  is to improve the well-being  of  so-
ciety. That is the point of departure of this
paper.  Current  farm  commodity  pro-
grams  do  not  serve  that  objective.  After
contrasting  the economic  environment  of
the early  1930s  for which  programs  were
designed with that of today,  I list changes
in current  programs  that would  be  more
nearly  consistent  with  meeting  economic
needs of producers,  consumers, taxpayers,
and, most importantly,  society at large.
The Economic  Setting for
Commodity  Programs
The Early 1930s
The  Hawley-Smoot  tariff  and  the  re-
covery  of agriculture  in Europe after the
devastation  of  World  War  I  had  almost
eliminated  foreign  markets  for our  farm
commodities  in the  early  1930s.  The  do-
mestic market demand was diminished by
falling domestic  consumer  income  work-
ing through a relatively high income elas-
ticity of demand.  Low  demand  and sup-
ply elasticities  with respect to  price made
agricultural  prices  highly  unstable.Western Journal of Agricultural Economics
Farmers were at the mercy of drouths and
business  cycles,  the  latter  seemingly  be-
yond  the  control  of  business  or  govern-
ment.
The  difficult  farm  economic  circum-
stances  in the  1920s only worsened  in the
early  1930s  with  the  onset  of  the  Great
Depression.  Economic  conditions  in  1933
had reached proportions motivating strong
government intervention in farm markets.
Income  per  capita  of  farmers  averaged
approximately one-third  that of nonfarm-
ers.  Income  was  low  among  almost  all
farmers;  perhaps  two-thirds  of  farmers
were  in poverty.  Foreclosures  were wide-
spread and farmers depended on farm in-
come  in  a  depression  economy  that  of-
fered  little  chance  for  off-farm
employment  and  income.  Most  farmers
were  ill-equipped  by  schooling,  experi-
ence,  or  skills  to earn  much  in nonfarm
jobs even  if they had been available.  Peo-
ple  were  returning  to  farms  because  25
percent  unemployment  and  inadequate
social  welfare  programs  left  the  unem-
ployed with few  alternatives.
Two-thirds  of farm  inputs were  "farm
produced"  land and labor. High fixed costs
and  low  variable  costs  made  output  un-
responsive to prices. Farmers continued to
produce  for a weak  market because  they
covered  low  variable  costs  even  at  de-
pressed commodity prices.  Mechanical in-
novations (mainly the tractor and its com-
plements)  potentially  substituting
improved capital for large amounts of land
and  labor  awaited  introduction  as  eco-
nomic  conditions  permitted.  Also  im-
proved  biological  inputs  from  science
awaited introduction with the potential to
create low resource returns for decades.
In short,  agriculture  not  only  was  cur-
rently distressed but faced  long-term  dis-
equilibrium.  The  economic  structure  of
agriculture  was  to  be  characterized  by
substitution  of  capital  for  labor  and  in-
creased  productivity  relative  to  demand
in the face of limited opportunity  for ad-
justments.  This  caused  chronic  low  in-
come and returns relative  to the nonfarm
sector  which would not be eased for many
years.
The  1980s
Changes  in demand,  supply,  and  insti-
tutions made for a very different environ-
ment  in  the  1980s  than  in  the  1930s.
Chronic  disequilibrium  in  resources,  pri-
marily  excess  farm labor,  had been  dissi-
pated by the late 1970s.  Farm population,
33 million in  1933, had fallen  to less than
six  million  persons  in  1984.  Farm  popu-
lation was nearly stable in the early  1980s
[Council of Economic  Advisors,  p.  340].
From  1965 to  1980,  rates of  return on
farm  resources  averaged  well  above  re-
turns  on  alternative  major  investments
[U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  1981,  p.
51].'  Farm  income  no  longer  chronically
lagged nonfarm income after adjusting the
former for tax advantages,  for the valued
farm  way  of life,  and  for  cost  of living.
Two-thirds  of  farm  inputs  were  pur-
chased  inputs  which could  be adjusted in
response to changing incentives.  The farm
population  received  two-thirds  of  its  in-
come  from  off-farm  sources,  hence  was
diversified  in  economic  sustenance.  The
small share of farmers  in total population
and  employment enhanced  opportunities
At issue is whether  returns would have been favor-
able in the  absence  of  commodity  programs.  Sim-
ulations of  the farming economy with  and without
commodity programs  tend to be consistent in show-
ing that commodity programs  have reduced  varia-
tion in farm  prices and  raised  farm  prices and  in-
comes  in  the  short  run.  For  gauging  long-term
impacts,  simulation results  are elusive,  erratic,  and
inconsistent.  Many  studies  (most  with  suspiciously
low long-run  supply and demand  elasticities)  show
lower farm prices,  incomes,  and  rates of return  for
extended  periods with  open markets.  On the  other
hand,  Nelson  and Cochrane  [1976]  estimated  that,
in the absence  of commodity  programs  after 1953,
net farm income would have been 58 percent above
the  actual  level  in  1971!  Later  in the  text,  I  make
a  case  that  commodity  programs  do not  raise  net
farm  income or  rates  of  return  in a  "long  run"  of
approximately  five years  or more.
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for farm people to find employment niches
in the nonfarm  economy.
In  contrast  to the  1930s,  farmers  now
depend  on  exports  for  a  significant  pro-
portion, approximately  one-fourth,  of de-
mand.  Foreign  demand  is  sensitive  to
price.  Long-term  export  demand appears
to  be  sufficiently  elastic  to  make  com-
bined  domestic  and  export  demand  for
farm output elastic [Tweeten  1983].  Thus,
sustained commodity  programs which  re-
strict  supply  and  arbitrarily  hold  prices
above market clearing  levels  reduce farm
receipts in the long-run.
Future Food Balance
If, as seems likely, future domestic  pop-
ulation will grow  0.9  percent  per year, if
real per capita income will grow  two per-
cent per year, if the domestic income elas-
ticity of demand  is 0.1, and if exports are
25 percent of demand and will grow three
percent  per  year,  then  future  total  de-
mand for farm  output will grow  1.6 per-
cent per year.  This  projected  growth rate
just  happens  to  equal  the  productivity
growth rate from  1960 to  1984 and from
1965  to  1982  but  is  slightly  higher  than
the 1.5 percent annual productivity growth
rate  from  1964  to  1984.  These  estimates
suggest that  demand  is  likely  to  increase
at about  the  same  rate  as  supply  due  to
productivity growth in the next decade.
Rapid and widespread adoption of vac-
cines,  hormones,  and  other  products  of
modern  biology  could  quicken  the  pace
of overall productivity gains. But no tech-
nology  is  on  the  horizon  with  anything
approaching  the  capacity  of  the  tractor
and its complements to displace labor from
agriculture.  Other estimates [O'Brien;  Re-
sources  for  the  Future]  project  slightly
faster  gains  in  supply  than  demand  for
farm output and hence project falling real
farm prices.  Any  estimate  is  crude  but  I
conclude that  whether  expansion  in sup-
ply will outrun that in demand (and bring
lower  real  farm  prices)  or  demand  will
outrun supply is too close to call.  The best
guess  is that real farm prices will tend to
follow  the  inverse  productivity  trend just
as in the past. No strong upward or down-
ward  trend  in  real farm  prices  is  antici-
pated. This suggests two  conclusions:
(1)  Because  the  elasticities  of  demand
and  supply with  respect to price have  in-
creased,  and  the  structure  of  farms  has
changed from previous decades, the farm-
ing industry is capable of adjusting to long-
term trends in real farm prices within the
relatively narrow range expected to occur.
That  is,  rates  of  return  on  resources  in
commercial  farming  will  adjust  to parity
with  returns elsewhere  in  the absence  of
commodity  programs.
(2) Shocks to the farming economy will
continue  from  year  to  year.  In  part  be-
cause of dependence on export markets in
a world  of market interventions which ex-
acerbate  shocks,  short-term  demand  for
our farm output may be even more unsta-
ble  than in the past.  Cycles also  will con-
tinue, with a few  years of favorable farm
prices but short world food supplies alter-
nating  with  longer  periods  of  low  farm
prices and excessive food supplies.
Reviewing  Farm Problems
It  is  apparent  that the  nature  of farm
supply, demand, and  prospects  for future
supply-demand  balance  have  changed.
Closer  examination  of  alleged  and  real
farm  problems  is necessary  to more fully
judge the place  for farm commodity  pro-
grams in  today's economy.
Apologists  for  commodity  programs
contend that farm  returns  will  be chron-
ically below  returns elsewhere  in the ab-
sence of farm commodity  programs.  It is
said that farmers persistently will earn low
returns because they  are price  takers, not
price  makers;  the farming  industry  is  an
island of atomistic competition  in a sea of
imperfect  competition.  It  is  also  alleged
that farming  is  the only  remaining  com-
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petitive sector-all other  sectors have ad-
ministered or negotiated  prices.
Small business in general  is highly com-
petitive  and  failure  rates are higher  than
in  farming  on  the  average.  Industries
characterized  by fewer  firms and admin-
istered  prices  can  also be  highly  compet-
itive.  Farm machinery, banking, and steel
firms-all  supposedly  in protected  indus-
tries-have had large economic losses and
high failure  rates in recent  years.  Most of
agriculture has gotten along without com-
modity programs.  Some sectors such as the
livestock  sector  not covered  by  commod-
ity programs may fare better without cur-
rent programs which  raise feed  costs.
Biological processes of nature create lags
between  application  of  inputs  and  real-
ization  of output.  This gives rise to unful-
filled  expectations,  to  commodity  cycles,
and  to general  uncertainty  disconcerting
to  farmers.  Farmers  call  for government
interventions  to eliminate such uncertain-
ties and guarantee prices.  The presence of
economic  problems  does  not  constitute  a
prima facie case for government interven-
tion,  however.  Costs  of intervention  may
exceed  benefits.  It is  essential  to separate
legitimate  needs  (which  can  be  met  by
government at a net social gain) from spe-
cial  pleadings,  exploitation  by special  in-
terests of an affluent  public's fear of  food
shortfalls,  and flexing  of political  muscle.
An Illusion of Low Returns in
Equilibrium
The structure  of agriculture will  create
an  illusion  of  low  real rates  of  return  in
agriculture even when returns are not low.
Analysis  of  all  resource  costs  relative  to
returns  for 1960,  1965,  1970,  1975,  1981,
and  1982  [see  Tweeten  1984,  p.  106  for
1982 estimate] indicates  that receipts cov-
ered  all resource  costs  on adequate-sized,
well-managed  farms  most  years and that
the parity price ratio required to cover all
costs tended to move  down  as productiv-
ity moved  up.2 In  1982  and  1983,  for ex-
ample,  gross farm  income  covered  all re-
source costs on the five percent of all farms
that accounted for half of all farm output.
Other  farms did  not  cover  all costs,  and
small  farms  required  $2  or  more  of  re-
source  costs  to  produce  $1  of  output.  It
follows  that  if  adequate-size  farms  are
breaking  even  on  the  average  and  other
farms  are losing  money,  then an average
of all  farms will be earning returns below
equilibrium  opportunity  cost  levels.  But
small farms are in equilibrium because tax
advantages  and  rural amenities  compen-
sate for low or negative before-tax returns.
Thus  average  low  returns  in  farming
masks the fact that in a normal year com-
paratively  few  (many of them mid-sized)
farms  are  earning  low  returns  not  com-
pensated by other factors.  Relatively little
labor  disequilibrium  remains  except
among mid-sized farms.  On the whole, at
least  five  percent  of  farm  production  re-
sources is not needed but the excess is land
and  capital  as well  as labor.
A  second  reason  why  farm  returns
chronically  will  appear  to  be  low  even
when not is because of heavy dependence
of agriculture  on farmland  as  an  asset.  It
can  be  shown  that  in  a  well-functioning
market  the  current  return  on  farmland,
Rt/Pt, is b - i' where Rt is current earnings
or  rent  in  year  t,  Pt  is  land  price,  b  is
desired  or  equilibrium  market-deter-
mined  real rate of return on farmland in-
vestment,  and  i'  is  expected  real growth
in  land  earnings.  Capital  gain  on  farm-
land  is i  +  i'  where i  is the  general infla-
tion  rate  and  i'  is  real  rate  of  growth  in
land earnings R and in land  price P. Thus
the total rate of return on farmland  is cur-
rent earnings  b  - i'  plus capital gains i  +
i'  or
(b - i')  + (i  + i')  = b + i.
The  farm  mortgage  interest  rate  is  nor-
mally a real  rate of interest  plus an infla-
2 Commodity  programs may have played a role-see
footnote  1.
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tion premium.  If  the  real rate of  interest
is  equal  to  b,  it  follows  that  all costs  of
mortgage  interest  equal  all  returns  in
equilibrium.  But if  inflation i or real land
earnings  growth  i'  is  high, current  earn-
ings rates  will be  low relative  to  nominal
(market) interest rates on farm mortgages.
For example  if  i'  is expected  to  be  .02
or two percent, a conservative  value based
on  1960s and  1970s experience,  if the  in-
flation rate  is  expected  to be  ten  percent
and  if,  as  historically  has  been  the  case,
farmland  investors  are  satisfied  with  a
current  real return on farmland  of  .05 or
five  percent,  then  the current  rate  of re-
turn  on  farmland  is  expected  to be b  -
i'=  .05  - .02  =  .03 or  three  percent.  If
the  real  interest  rate  is  five  percent,  the
market  mortgage interest rate normally is
5  +  i  or  15  percent.  The current  return
on  farmland  of  three  percent  and  mort-
gage interest rate of 15 percent means that
earnings  from  five  acres  are  required  to
pay  the  interest  on  one  acre!  But the  15
percent  total  return  to  farmland  (three
percent  current  return  plus  two  percent
real capital gain plus ten percent nominal
capital  gain)  covers  the entire  15 percent
mortgage  interest rate.
The  cash-flow  problem  is  severe  for  a
land owner receiving  a three percent cur-
rent return and paying  15 percent interest
although his real rate of return is five per-
cent.  The  liquidity  problem  intensifies
with higher  inflation rates and  higher ex-
pected real growth rates in land earnings.
Inflation  raises immediate  costs  for mort-
gages but defers returns because  a higher
proportion  of  earnings  come  as  capital
gain.
In conclusion,  inflation and real growth
in  land  earnings  create  low  current  re-
turns relative to market interest rates. This
generates very real cash-flow  problems and
the illusion of low real returns on farming
assets.  The  family  farm  is  not  well
equipped  to  cope  with  cash-flow  prob-
lems. Nonfarm investors  and publicly-held
corporations  with access to diversified debt
and  equity  capital  may  cope  with  less
hardship.  In  fact, they  may  prefer  to re-
ceive  returns  as  capital  gain  taxed  at  a
lower  rate  than  ordinary  income.  Also,
small  farms  with  plentiful  off-farm  in-
come can  cope with  cash-flow  problems.
Mid-sized  farms  dependent  on  farm  in-
come  face  the  greatest  difficulty.  Farm
commodity programs can reduce cash-flow
problems  temporarily.  However,  raising
farm  price  supports to  alleviate  cash-flow
shortfalls raises land values and intensifies
cash-flow  problems  for  would-be  or  ex-
panding farm  owner-operators.
Farm Problems and Farm Size
Agriculture  is a more heterogeneous  in-
dustry  in  the  1980s  than  it  was  in  the
1930s.  The industry  defies easy  classifica-
tion, but three farm  types  stand out.
One  is  large  farms  with  sales  of  over
$200,000  per  year.  Farms  with  sales  of
$200,000  to  $500,000  had  $76,844  of  in-
come from all resources in 1983, net worth
of  $1,247,458  on  January  1, 1984,  and  a
current  rate  of  return  of  six  percent  on
farm  assets;  farms  with  sales  of  over
$500,000  had much  higher  incomes,  net
worth,  and  rate  of  return  on  assets  [U.S.
Department  of Agriculture,  1984,  pp. 53,
131].  It is  difficult indeed  to make  a  case
for income  transfers to such farms, which
are much wealthier  than the average  tax-
payer  and  account  for  nearly  half  of  all
farm output and five percent of all farms.
A  second  notable  type  is  small  farms
with  commodity  sales  less  than  $40,000
per  year.  These  farms  averaged  approxi-
mately  $20,000  income  from  off-farm
sources in 1983; their net farm income was
negligible. Current rates of return on their
resources  have been  negative  for  several
years. The stable or increasing  number of
such  farms indicates  they are  not in  eco-
nomic  disequilibrium.  As  noted  earlier,
most of these farms accept farm losses be-
cause they are compensated  by tax write-
offs against off-farm  income  and by rural
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amenities.  They accounted  for 72  percent
of  all  farms  but  for  only  13  percent  of
farms  output  in  1983.  They  are  not  di-
rectly  helped  much  by  commodity  pro-
grams because they have little to sell. They
may be hurt indirectly because commod-
ity programs provide more capital and se-
curity to larger farms.  Larger farms then
use that advantage  to compete  effectively
with  smaller  farms  for  markets  and  re-
sources.  The full-time  small  farm  has  al-
most  vanished.  It  is  difficult  to  make  a
case  for  current commodity  programs  to
help preserve small  farms.
Mid-sized  farms  with  sales  of  $40,000
to  $200,000  numbered  113,000  and  ac-
counted  for  24  percent  of  all  farms  and
39  percent  of  farm  output  in  1983  [U.S.
Department  of Agriculture,  1984,  pp. 80,
85].  On these  farms in  1983,  rates of cur-
rent  return  to  assets  averaged  approxi-
mately three percent;  24 to 36 percent  of
them  experienced  substantial  debt  stress
[Tweeten,  1985].  Because they have higher
debt-asset  ratios and rely more on income
from  the  farm  than  do  small  farms  and
because  they  are  less  efficient  and  have
less  potential  markets  than  large  farms,
mid-sized farms  depend  heavily  on com-
modity  programs  for  survival.  Mid-sized
farms  receive  approximately  40  percent
of their  receipts  from  output  covered  by
commodity programs.  This contrasts with
farms  with  sales  of over  $500,000  which
receive  only  15 percent  of  their  receipts
from  products  covered  by  commodity
programs.  Commodity  programs normal-
ly costing $15 billion per year seem a high
price  to  cover  16  percent  of  farm  out-
put-40 percent of the output on the farms
accounting for 39 percent of all farm out-
put.  If  $15  billion  were  divided  equally
among  the  mid-sized  farms,  payments
would be  $133,000  per farm.
Evaluation of  Farm Problems
The  foregoing  discussion  and  other
sources  highlight  at least  five farm  prob-
lems:  (1)  instability;  (2)  low  income,  low
wealth,  and  poverty;  (3)  demise  of  the
family  farm;  (4) environmental  degrada-
tion, especially  soil  erosion;  and  (5) cash-
flow  shortfalls.  But  as  indicated  earlier,
presence of farm problems is not a prima
facia case for government to alleviate those
problems.  Some  problems  are dealt  with
better by the market  or modified govern-
ment programs  than by extant  programs.
How  commodity programs  relate to  each
of the above problems is  discussed below.
Economic Instability
The impact on agriculture of instability
from  unforseeable  shocks  of  man  or  na-
ture  is  exacerbated  by  low  short-run  de-
mand and supply elasticities.  Commodity
programs  can  dampen  instability  by  sta-
bilizing  supplies  and  prices  through  sup-
ply controls, price supports, stock reserves,
and other  measures.
Uncertainty  has  characterized  farming
since its very  origins.  It is  difficult to be-
lieve that  any  operator  would  enter  that
"kitchen"  unaware  of  or  unprepared  to
"stand the heat." Some persons prefer risk
and seek it. Instability and uncertainty are
not  confined to agriculture.  The gambler
in Las Vegas confronts instability and  un-
certainty each day. The government taxes
rather than subsidizes  that activity.  Spec-
ulators in the futures market also face large
risks and most lose money. Again the gov-
ernment provides no direct subsidy to los-
ers, although it does  allow tax writeoff  of
some losses.
Instability unchecked can exact massive
social  cost.  The private  market  and gov-
ernment  are  the two  basic  institutions  to
deal  with instability.  If marginal  private
and social costs (benefits) coincide, private
markets  will  act  in the  public  interest  to
reduce instability to socially optimal levels.
It may be contended that these conditions
are  not  met  because  the  private  storage
trade  has  higher  discount  rates  than  the
public  and because  the  private  trade will
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not store enough to cope with large shocks
such  as wars, international  famine,  or ex-
port embargoes.  However, it is not enough
to  show  that  gains  are  potentially  large
from government  versus private efforts to
stabilize  farm  and  food  prices.  Govern-
ment failure with interventions may create
larger net social costs than private market
failure the interventions  were supposed to
correct.  Based on his own considerable  re-
search  as  well  as  that  of others,  Gardner
[1984]  concluded that studies  ". . . do  not
provide support  for  optimism  about gov-
ernmental  action  to  remedy  instability
problems"  [p.  59].
If  it is advisable  to supplement  private
markets,  simpler  and  less  costly  govern-
ment programs to reduce variation in farm
and food  markets  seem feasible.  Alterna-
tives include farm revenue insurance, fed-
eral  assistance  to increase  use of  forward
contracting  including  hedging  and  put
options, and/or a subsidy of, say, 30 cents
per bushel to producers for holding buffer
stocks. The latter  would have no specified
acquisition  or  release  price  but  might be
supplemented  by  modest-sized  govern-
ment-held  emergency  grain  reserves
somewhat  insulated from  markets.
Low Income and Wealth
Because of huge capital and managerial
requirements, commercial  farmers cannot
survive long with chronic low income, low
wealth,  or  poverty.  Chronic  poverty  is
rarely  found  on  commercial  farms.  The
low-wealth-income  problem  is  confined
mostly to small farms.
Commercial  farmers  have  higher  in-
come and wealth than  do nonfarmers  on
the average.  So  wealth  transfers  to  com-
mercial  farmers  do  not  seem  warranted.
Many  commercial  farmers  have  tempo-
rarily  low  or  negative  income.  But  it  is
difficult  to build  a case  for transfers  to  a
producer  with  a  $100,000  farm  loss  but
who  has $1 million  of net  worth to draw
upon. Commodity  programs are not a cost-
effective  way  to  alleviate  poverty-only
one in ten dollars  of commodity program
payments  go  to  the  poor.  An  income
maintenance  program  targeting the  poor
makes  more  sense  than  commodity  pro-
grams-if the objective  is to alleviate pov-
erty.
Supply controls and other price support
instruments to raise farm income lose their
effectiveness  in the long  run not  only be-
cause  they  provide  incentives  to  expand
production and to reduce consumption but
also  because  benefits  are capitalized  into
the  fixed  instrument  of control-land  in
most cases.  Hired  workers benefit little  if
at  all  from  programs,  renters  lose  their
gains  to  landlords,  and  new  owners  lose
their benefits to former owners.  Thus over
time  the  income  benefits  of  farm  com-
modity programs are lost to intended ben-
eficiaries.
Demise of Family Farms
Excluding  large  farms  (nonfamily  cor-
porations and operations hiring more than
1.5  person-years  of  labor)  and  part-time
farms which derive more than half of their
income  from  off-farm  sources,  the  re-
maining "family farms" account for a de-
clining share of farm numbers and output.
Debate  rages  over  whether  commodity
programs  help preserve  such  farms.  Per-
haps  most  agricultural  economists  claim
commodity  programs  have  resulted  in
fewer family farms.  However, my conclu-
sion after examining considerable  data and
logic  is  that  commodity  programs  have
been  neutral [Tweeten,  1984,  pp. 31-33].
They  have  neither  helped  nor  hurt  the
family farm in its struggle to survive over
the long run.
If preserving the family farm is deemed
to be important,  program  benefits  would
need  to  be targeted  to such  farms.  That
would  require  emphasizing  direct  pay-
ments  and  foregoing  supply  control.  It is
impossible  to  exclude  nonfamily  farms
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from  price  enhancement  of  supply  con-
trol.  And  it  is  difficult  to  control  supply
without  including large farms  accounting
for  over  half  of  farm  output.  Giving  up
supply control means giving up price sup-
ports  above  market-clearing  levels  be-
cause  the only  realistic  way  to eliminate
large  surpluses  without  supply  control  is
to sell them at a market-clearing  price.
A  program  of direct payments  focused
on family  farms and without  supply  con-
trol or price supports would help make the
U.S.  competitive  in world markets.  Trea-
sury  costs  could  be  held  below  current
levels  if  payments  were  restricted  to  the
16 percent  of total U.S.  farm  output  now
covered  on  mid-sized  farms.  Producers
who object to sales in export market below
full  production  costs  would  have the  op-
tion to not produce.  A costly bureaucracy
required to control supply would be freed
for  more  productive  employment  else-
where.
An  alternative  is to terminate  all  com-
modity programs including targeted assis-
tance  to family  farms.  The  result  would
be  both  lower  food  costs  and  Treasury
outlays.  Family  farms  would  fade  away
very  slowly  with  some  unfavorable  con-
sequences  for  rural  communities.  Local
farm  production  would  continue,  how-
ever.  Korsching  [1984]  found  little differ-
ence in the  degree  to which  farmers  op-
erating  farms  of  various  structural
characteristics  (size  of  farm,  degree  of
ownership,  gross  farm  income,  credit
usage,  or  complexity  of  business  opera-
tion)  purchased  goods  or  services  from
either local  communities  or  larger,  more
distant  communities.  Many  rural  com-
munities no longer depend on agriculture
for an economic base and would  continue
to  prosper.  For the  most part,  the nation
has not  maintained  industries  just to pre-
serve communities.  Mining ghost towns are
evidence.  Net social costs probably are less
for programs  of training,  counseling,  and
moving  assistance  than  for  subsidies  to
maintain  declining  local  industry.
Environmental  Degradation,
Especially Soil Erosion
Chemical  residues  in  the  soil  and
groundwater  supplies  and  on  farm prod-
ucts constitute  a social  problem  but com-
modity programs  have little  impact.  Soil
erosion  is  the most serious  environmental
problem  in  agriculture  but  again  com-
modity  programs  have  not  helped  to  al-
leviate the problem [Batie; Reichelderfer].
By  encouraging  "sod-busting,"  commod-
ity  programs  may  have  contributed  to
conversion  of  grassland  to  cropland  and
hence to soil erosion.
Current  commodity  programs  do  not
protect the environment but they could be
changed  to better serve that objective. One
approach  would  be  to  designate  the  30
million cropland acres with the highest ra-
tios  of  soil  loss  to tolerance  (T)  value  as
ineligible for commodity programs but el-
igible for a 20-year easement for cropping
rights.  In return for a payment,  the land-
owners could be required  to follow a con-
servation plan and  could graze or hay the
land but could not crop it for 20 years.  If
a food  crisis arose, the easement  could  be
declared void  by government  for the du-
ration of the crisis.
Cash-Flow
Liquidity  problems  arising  from  infla-
tion  and  life-cycle  problems  of  refinanc-
ing family  farms  each  generation  can  be
severe even if real rates of return on farm
resources are favorable. Price supports and
supply controls may only worsen cash-flow
and farm-entry  problems  by  driving  up
farm  asset  values  relative  to  real  earning
capabilities.
Commodity  programs  do  not  address
the basic causes of cash-flow  problems. By
adding to federal outlays, commodity pro-
grams  can  aggravate  unsound  macroeco-
nomic  policies  which  have  been  a major
source of farm and nonfarm economic ills.
The proper solution to cash-flow problems
is sound macroeconomic  policies.
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Other Problems
The financial stress problem in the 1980s
is unprecedented  and does  not fall neatly
into the five categories  of problems listed
above. It behaves  much like the cash-flow
problem caused  by high nominal  interest
rates.  But  unlike  the  cash-flow  problem
(with  capital  gains  providing  deferred
compensation for high interest to bring fa-
vorable  real  returns),  high  real  interest
rates  cause low real returns relative  to in-
terest  costs.  Financial  stress  is  felt  most
acutely  by  indebted  farmers  but  real
wealth  losses accrue  to  all real-asset  own-
ers.
High  real  interest  and  exchange  rates
will  not  persist.  Hence  financial  stress  is
most  properly  classified  as  a  continuing
manifestation  of  the  instability  problem.
The  best  solution  to financial  stress is not
more  generous  price  supports  but  sound
macroeconomic  policies  and  targeted
credit assistance.
Thus  far,  I  have  examined  farm  com-
modity  programs  and the  problems  they
address  individually.  It is  possible  to rec-
ognize  tradeoffs  among  consumers,  tax-
payers, and  producers  to arrive at  overall
net  social  costs  of  commodity  programs.
Net  social  cost,  defined  as  the  value  of
goods and  services foregone and  hence of
national income  sacrificed  by commodity
programs,  ranges  up to 5 percent  of  gross
value  of  output  for  some  commodities
[Gardner,  1981,  p.  73;  Tweeten,  1979,  p.
485].  Adding  resources  for  program
administration  and  for lobbying  to  influ-
ence political outcomes  further raises  loss-
es  in  national  income  from  commodity
programs.  It  is  doubtful  that  intangible
program benefits not included in the anal-
ysis would  compensate  for  the loss in na-
tional income.
Formulating a Transition
Program to a Market-Centered
Agriculture
An  animal  capable  of  thriving  in  the
wild  can  lose that capability  in  captivity.
If  the  animal  is  not  properly  prepared,
returning  the  animal  to  its natural  envi-
ronment  can  be  fatal.  So  it  is  with  agri-
culture.  A  transition  program  is  essential
to ease return to a market-centered  econ-
omy. Several elements  of such a program
are listed  below.
(1) The  most important  component  of
a  transition  program  is  to  provide  agri-
culture  "a  level  playing  field."  Many  of
farmers'  economic  hardships  were  im-
posed by poorly conceived  macroeconom-
ic  and  trade  policies.  Pursuit  of  sound
monetary-fiscal policy that does not create
aberrations  such as unusually high real in-
terest and exchange rates would make liv-
ing  without  commodity  programs  more
tolerable  to  farmers.  The appropriate  fis-
cal  policy is budget  deficits during reces-
sion  and  budget  surpluses  or  a  balanced
budget  in  a  full-employment  economy.
Money  supply  could  increase  perhaps  six
percent  per  year  with  more  rapid  in-
creases  during  recession.  International
trade  policy  needs  to  work  towards  re-
moval  of  trade  barriers,  foregoing  of  ex-
port embargoes,  and firm commitment to
our  reputation  as  a reliable  supplier.  Se-
lective  export  subsidies  could  be  used  to
countervail  and  roll  back  subsidies  of
competing  exporters.  The  overall  objec-
tive, however,  is to use willingness to end
our  own  import  barriers,  price  supports,
and  export  subsidies  as a bargaining  chip
to end  such  policies in other  countries.
Income tax features  such as investment
tax credits, depreciation  in  excess of mar-
ket  rates,  and  writeoff  of  capital  outlays
as current expenses  encourage investment
in an industry already burdened by excess
capacity.  Subsidized  credit  programs  do
the  same.  Phase-out  of  public  programs
encouraging  substitution  of capital for la-
bor would contribute to the "level playing
field"  needed  by farmers  to prosper  in  a
market-centered  agriculture.
(2)  U.S.  agriculture  in  1983  had  five
percent  excess capacity  defined  as  output
with normal weather in excess of what the
267
TweetenWestern Journal of Agricultural  Economics
market  will  absorb  at  current  prices  and
now  removed  from  markets  by  govern-
ment  programs  [Tweeten,  1984,  p.  96].
That  excess  capacity  had  grown  to  per-
haps  six  percent  by  1985.  Also,  stocks  of
some  commodities  are  excessive.  Wheat
stocks  are  projected  to  exceed  normal
levels  by  one-half  by  June  1986.  If  pro-
ducers  are  to  be  given  a  fair  chance  to
survive  in  the  market alone,  they  should
not be expected to bear the burden of dis-
sipating excessive  stocks accumulated  un-
der  past  government  support  programs.
Low  prices for an extended period would
be  necessary  to eliminate the  stock  over-
hang before farmers would have a chance
for  prices  to  cover  production  costs.  A
transition  program  could  remove  exces-
sive  stocks  by a  payment-in-kind  supply-
control program  or other means.
(3) Stocks and  excess production capac-
ity  have  accumulated  because  supports
have priced U.S. commodities out of world
markets  and  have  encouraged  excessive
production.  Wheat is a stark example. The
wheat  allotment  base  increased  from  53
million  acres  in  1975  to  93  million  acres
in  1985.  Program  incentives  combined
with  slippage  over  the  years  probably
caused output to be larger  in  1985 with a
30 percent diversion program  than would
have occurred in the absence of commod-
ity programs  since  1975.
If  voluntary  diversion  programs  no
longer  control  production  at  a  tolerable
Treasury  cost,  lower  market  prices  may
be necessary.  Loan rates could be reduced
to  market-clearing  levels  or,  better  yet,
eliminated.  For  this  to  occur  without
bankrupting farmers, direct payments are
needed.  Payments  would  not  be  condi-
tioned  on  present  or  future  acreage  or
yield  but  would  feature  limitations  per
producer  to  reduce  Treasury  cost.  Pay-
ments would ensure maintaining net farm
income  during a transition  period before
a  market  corn  price  of,  say,  $2.00  per
bushel  and  market  wheat  price  of  $2.50
per  bushel  reduced output  and expanded
sales to clear markets.  Payments might be
phased  out in five to  ten years.
It  appears  hypocritical  simultaneously
to call for federal  fiscal responsibility  and
for a  costly  transition  program  featuring
direct payment  of  $15  billion  per year-
at least initially. Fiscal policy in effect tax-
es farm  exports  40 percent  and  subsidizes
imports  40  percent.  Adjusting  to  a  mar-
ket-centered  agriculture  can  be  free  nei-
ther  of trauma  to farmers  nor of  costs  to
government.  The government bears a ma-
jor share of blame for farmers'  current  fi-
nancial distress; this is no time to abandon
farmers to their own devices  without aid-
ing  them  with a  transition  program.  Siz-
able  direct  payments  in  a  transition  pro-
gram buy time to reduce real interest and
exchange  rates.  High Treasury  outlays  in
the short run will  be offset by lower food
costs.  The  net long-run  cost of  a market-
centered agriculture will be less than with
continuation  of current  programs.
A  common  assertion  is  that  a  market-
centered agriculture would cause (a) swift
demise  of  the  family  farm,  (b)  takeover
of  farm  production  by  a  few  large  cor-
porate  industrial  conglomerates,  and  (c)
high  food  prices  made  possible  by  bar-
gaining power of the conglomerates.  Each
part of  this assertion  is without  substance
or support.  If broiler industry history  is a
guide, in the unlikely event that farm pro-
duction  would  be  concentrated  in  a few
firms the  result  would  be  increased  effi-
ciency  and lower food prices.
Summary and Conclusions
Farm  commodity  programs  devised
over  one-half  century  ago and continued
in  essentially  the  same  form  today  have
outlived their usefulness.  The structure of
agriculture  as  apparent  in  supply,  de-
mand,  farm  income,  disequilibrium,  and
income  and asset  distribution  is very  dif-
ferent today than in  1933. Comparatively
little excesss labor remains in farming. The
industry  is resilient and capable of adjust-
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ing  to  supply-demand  disequilibrium
likely to  develop over  the next decade  or
two.
Commodity programs have caused some
of the current problems of agriculture.  But
macroeconomic  policies  especially  have
distorted markets, hurting the farming in-
dustry  by  raising  real  interest  and  ex-
change rates. The farming industry is hurt
more  than  other  industries  because  it  is
capital  intensive  (and  interest  is  a  major
cost  of  capital),  is  a  major  net  debtor
(creditors  gain  from  high  real  interest
rates),  and depends  more  than  other  in-
dustries  on  export  markets.  Farmers  de-
serve  a  "level  playing  field"  in  macro-
economic  and trade policies if they are to
take on  the rigors of the  market.
The  farming  industry  has  been  too
abused  by macroeconomic  policy and too
dependent  on commodity  programs to be
ready  for  the  rigors  of  an  unrestricted
market  "overnight."  Excess  capacity  is  at
least five percent  and stocks  of some com-
modities are excessive.  A temporary  pay-
ment-in-kind  program  to  reduce  excess
stocks,  a reduction  of loan  rates,  and  siz-
able  direct  payments  are suggested  com-
ponents  of  a  transition  program  to  exit
government  from  farming.
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